I. Introduction
The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (Pub. L. 103-383) does not amend title IV-D of the Social Security Act and therefore does not directly change Federal IV-D program requirements. However, this law impacts the interstate processing of child support cases, including IV-D cases. Because the new law is a Federal statute which addresses the power of a tribunal to act when a child support order has been established in another State, OCSE has received inquiries regarding its meaning and effect. This Information Memorandum is designed to provide guidance and an initial administrative interpretation of the new law. The application and meaning of the statute will likely be further clarified by court decisions and case law. (For example, see In re Isabel M. (Thomas M.); NY FamCt KingsCty, NYLJ 3/21/95. Further discussion of this case may be found later in this document under Question/Answer #12. OCSE would appreciate receiving information about other case law developments in this area.)
II. Provisions of the New Federal Law
The new Federal law requires tribunals of each State to enforce, according to its terms, a child support order issued by a court (defined to also include an administrative authority) of another State, if: (1) the issuing State's tribunal had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter and enter an order; (2) the issuing State's tribunal had personal jurisdiction over the parties; and, (3) reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard was given to the parties. The issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order as long as the child or at least one of the parties resides in the issuing State, unless the tribunal of another State, acting in accordance with the new Federal law, has modified the support order. However, the power to modify a support order of another State is restricted.
Limited Power to Modify
A tribunal of a State can modify the support order of another State's tribunal only if: (1) the tribunal seeking to make the modification has jurisdiction to make the modification; and, (2) the tribunal of the original issuing State no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the order, either because the child and the parties to the case are no longer residents of the issuing State, or the parties have filed written consent allowing the tribunal seeking the modification to make the modification and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. If another State does properly modify an order based on the foregoing conditions, the issuing State's tribunal retains authority to enforce the prior order with respect to nonmodifiable obligations and arrearages that accrued before the modification.
Choice of Law
In addition, the new Federal law specifies that the forum State's law applies in a proceeding to establish, modify, or enforce a support order, except that: (1) the law of the State of the tribunal that issued the order applies when interpreting the order; and, (2) the longer statute of limitations of either the forum State or the State of the tribunal that issued the order applies when enforcing a support order.
III. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)
The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act is patterned after Section 8 of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)--legislation passed by Congress in 1980 to address the problems caused by the lack of uniform enforcement of child custody orders.
Therefore, the interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act provided in this Information Memorandum is drawn, in part, from an examination of Section 8 of the PKPA and relevant court rulings and case law.
IV. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)
The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act should be read in conjunction with State law governing interstate case processing. Until 1993, all States had adopted and were using some version of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA), or a similar uniform State law (e.g., USDL--Uniform Support of Dependents Law). However, over the past two years, at least twenty-three States have adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)--a model State law governing interstate processing that substantially revises and expands (R)URESA.
While the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act does not mandate State adoption of UIFSA, it complements and corresponds more closely with UIFSA than it does with (R)URESA. For example, the new Federal law provides for continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over child support orders, a concept that is included in UIFSA. The new Federal statute's choice of law provision also corresponds more closely with UIFSA's choice of law provision than with those of (R)URESA.
V. Questions and Answers Regarding the New Federal Law
Overview of the New Federal Law
1. Question: What is the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act?
Answer: The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution and explicit Federal law (28 U.S.C. 1738) establish the principle of giving recognition to judgments and laws of sister State tribunals. Generally these authorities have been interpreted to apply to final orders, but not to modifiable orders involving an ongoing obligation. Paternity orders are considered final judgments and are therefore entitled to full faith and credit in other States. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Pub. L. 103-66) required States to have laws and procedures under which a State must give full faith and credit to a determination of paternity made by any other State, whether established by voluntary acknowledgment or by court or administrative processes. Any payments or installments of support under any child support orders, likewise, are considered final judgments and therefore must be afforded full faith and credit. The "Bradley Amendment" (Section 9103 of Pub. L. 99-509), codified at 42 U.S.C.666(a)(9) and in regulations at 45 CFR 303.106, amended title IV-D of the Social Security Act in 1986. This provision requires that past due support installments must be treated as final judgments by operation of law, and not be subject to retroactive modification.
However, prior to the enactment of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, in interstate actions, a State frequently would not recognize and prospectively enforce a support order issued by another State's tribunal unless it was registered and, thus, became an order of the responding State. Rather, a responding (R)URESA State typically entered a new "de novo" order--leading to multiple existing orders, often in disparate amounts, and resulting in confusion about the current support and arrearage amounts. This determination of duty and ability to pay occurred in the responding State regardless of whether a valid, enforceable order for support already existed in that, or another, State. The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act addresses this problem by making a judgment for support enforceable, on its own terms, by other States, and restricting the ability of a responding tribunal to make a new order or change the existing one except in limited circumstances. Therefore, the new law should ensure that support orders are recognized and enforced across State lines.
2. Question: In general, does the new Federal law override State law?
Answer: Yes; to the extent State law conflicts or is inconsistent with Federal law, Federal law preempts such State law. The PKPA and its relation to State law governing custody orders (e.g., the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act) is instructive on this point. Legislative history and case law regarding the PKPA show that the Federal law preempts State law where there is a conflict between State and Federal law. To the extent that State and Federal law do not directly conflict, the two should be viewed as complementary and read in the aggregate. A similar interpretation regarding the relationship between the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act and State law (URESA, RURESA, USDL, UIFSA) is appropriate. The new Federal statute does not mandate that States enact new laws, but States may want to change State laws, procedures, and court rules or practices to make them consistent with the Federal law and to avoid legal challenges.
Full Faith and Credit
3. Question: What is "full faith and credit"?
Answer: Full faith and credit is the principle that an out of-state order, obtained by a lawful exercise of jurisdiction, should be recognized and given the same force and effect in all other States as it would be given in the State of origin. When a State gives full faith and credit to another State's order, it honors the terms of that order as it would its own orders. Sometimes this means enforcing an order that could not be entered in the enforcing State.
More specifically, the new Federal law provides that a State shall enforce according to its terms a child support order issued by a tribunal of another State. Furthermore, a State shall not seek or make a modification to another State's order unless: (1) the tribunal seeking to make the modification has jurisdiction to make the modification; and, (2) the tribunal of the issuing State no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the order because the child and other parties to the case are no longer residents of the issuing State or the parties have filed written permission for the tribunal seeking the modification to make the modification and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
4. Question: Which child support orders must be afforded full faith and credit?
Answer: Under subsection (c) of the new Federal law (28 U.S.C. 1738B), any child support order is entitled to full faith and credit if:
(1) the issuing State's tribunal had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter and enter an order (i.e., the tribunal had the power to deal with the subject involved in the action);
(2) the issuing State's tribunal had personal jurisdiction over the parties (i.e., the tribunal had power over the individuals in the action); and,
(3) the parties were given reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard (before the original order was entered).
If a support order meets these three conditions, it is entitled to full faith and credit regardless of whether it was issued before or after the effective date of the new Federal law.
A support order that does not meet all three of these criteria may be subject to challenge, in either the original forum or in the State where enforcement is sought. In addition, although not explicitly indicated by the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, once an original support order has been subsequently modified in accordance with Federal law, section 1738B(f) implies that the original order would not be afforded full faith and credit, except for nonmodifiable obligations and arrearages remaining due up to the date of modification by another tribunal. [The term "nonmodifiable obligations" is not defined by the new Federal law; UIFSA uses a similar term--"nonmodifiable aspects of an order".]
5. Question: Does a State have to give full faith and credit to a child support order entered by an administrative authority?
Answer: Yes, administrative orders must be given full faith and credit under the new law. In its report to the Congress, "Supporting Our Children: A Blueprint for Reform," the U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support explained that, in the past, some tribunals have refused to recognize and afford full faith and credit to other States' administrative orders. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66) addressed this issue for paternity determinations by requiring that States have laws and procedures under which a State must give full faith and credit to a determination of paternity made by any other State, regardless of whether the determination was made through voluntary acknowledgment, administrative, or judicial processes.
The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act addresses this issue in relation to child support orders. Although the new law applies to orders made by a "court", 1738B(b) defines "court" to mean a court or administrative agency of a State that is authorized by State law to establish the amount of child support payable by a contestant or make a modification of a child support order. A growing number of States are using an administrative, non-judicial process for establishing orders.
Modification
6. Question: What is continuing, exclusive jurisdiction?
Answer: Although not explicitly defined by the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, as used in õõ1738B(d) and (e), refers to the authority to modify a child support order. In contrast to the traditional concept of continuing jurisdiction, under which the issuing tribunal retained authority over all of the orders it entered, continuing, exclusive jurisdiction only provides for the issuing tribunal to maintain authority so long as specified circumstances still exist.
The tribunal that issues an order maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (the authority to modify the order) as long as at least one of the contestants or the child resides in the issuing tribunal's State, or until another State's tribunal, acting in accordance with Federal law, has modified the order. (Note: contestants can file written consent to allow a non-issuing State's tribunal to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction). If the issuing tribunal loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction because the parties and the child no longer reside in the State, another State's tribunal with jurisdiction can modify the order in accordance with 1738B(e).
7. Question: Under the new Federal law, can an issuing State modify its own order if it no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction?
Answer: No. An issuing State cannot modify its own order if it no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (unless both parties provide written consent). See section 1738B(d) of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act. For States that have enacted UIFSA, section 205 of UIFSA and the official comments to that section specifically indicate that a State cannot modify its own order once it loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. However,1738B(f) of the new Federal law specifies that once a State loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, it still has the ability to enforce nonmodifiable obligations and arrearages.
8. Question: If an issuing tribunal loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and its order is modified by another State's tribunal, does the modifying State gain continuing exclusive jurisdiction?
Answer: Yes, the modifying State, which must have personal jurisdiction over both parties, gains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (i.e., the authority to modify) if at least one of the contestants or the child resides in that modifying State at the time an action for modification is presented. Section 1738B(d) says that a tribunal that has "made" a child support order consistently with this section has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order if one of the parties or the child resides in the State. Although "made" is not defined, we believe that it can be interpreted broadly to mean "established or modified". For States that have adopted UIFSA, UIFSA explicitly says that a modifying State gains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Section 611(d) of UIFSA provides that upon issuance of an order modifying a child support order issued in another State, the modifying tribunal becomes the tribunal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. As a prerequisite to making a modification, the modifying State must have personal jurisdiction over both parties.
The modifying State retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction as long as it continues to be the residence of a party or the child (or until the order is modified by another State in accordance with Federal law). As a result,the new Federal law helps promote a "one order, one time, one place" system which avoids the problems associated with multiple orders.
9. Question: Under Part IV of (R)URESA, an order registered for enforcement was subject to modification by the registering State. This raised concerns about whether modification of the registered order also modified the underlying order. Does the new Federal law address this problem?
Answer: Yes. As long as a party remains in the issuing State, the new Federal law eliminates the risk of opening the underlying order to modification that was associated with registering an order in a (R)URESA State. A State registering another State's order pursuant to Part IV of the 1958 URESA or the 1968 RURESA can no longer modify an order unless conditions in section 1738B(e) of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act are met. This effect should alleviate reservations and reluctance on the part of obligees about registering orders in other States for the purpose of prospective enforcement and collection of arrearages, since the State where the order is registered has no authority to modify, so long as another State retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
10. Question: How does the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act impact the Federal requirements for review and adjustment of child support orders at 45 CFR 303.8?
Answer: The Federal requirements for review and adjustment remain as stated at 45 CFR 303.8. However, some of the discussion contained in the preamble to the final regulation published December 28, 1992 at 57 FR 61559 has been affected by the new Federal law.
In the Response to Comments section of the preamble to the final regulation, one commenter asked whether a rendering tribunal has jurisdiction to honor a request to adjust an order for support if neither party presently resides in that State. We responded that, absent any controlling Federal law, State law governs such circumstances. We also mentioned that a tribunal which enters a child support order generally retains continuing jurisdiction to review and adjust the order, regardless of the present residence of the parties. (57 FR 61559, 61580).
This response requires clarification, as a result of enactment of 28 U.S.C. 1738B, the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act. Federal law, rather than State law, now governs this issue. The new Federal law specifies that the issuing tribunal has continuing jurisdiction to modify its order only as long as a party or the child resides in the issuing tribunal's State [unless the nonresident parties file written consent allowing the issuing State to modify its order in accordance with õ1738B(e)(2)(B)].
De Novo Orders
11. Question: Under (R)URESA, a responding State typically enters a de novo child support order when presented with a standard URESA petition and other forms. The responding State tribunal determines duty of support and ability to pay, culminating in a new order of the responding State. This often occurs even if an order exists in another State, and precipitates the problem of multiple orders for the same child, usually in different amounts. In light of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, can a (R)URESA State enter a de novo order if one or more orders for the same obligor/obligee/child already exist?
Answer: The new Federal law does not specifically address the issue of de novo orders. Arguably, however, the preferred approach, and the approach that is most consistent with the spirit of the new law, is to avoid entry of a de novo order in a case where there is already an existing order governing the same parties.
The new Federal law clearly indicates that deference should be given to existing orders. Section 1738B(a) of the law provides that a State shall enforce an existing child support order according to its terms, and shall only modify another State's order under limited and specified circumstances. While entry of a de novo order in a case with an existing order governing the same parties does not legally modify the terms of the original order, it may have the practical effect of a modification. If the support amount in the de novo order is lower than the amount in the original order, the family may receive less support if the obligor pays under the terms of the de novo order.
The new Federal law defines modification as "a change in a child support order that affects the amount, scope, or duration of the order and modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to the child support order" (emphasis added). The language "or otherwise is made subsequent to the child support order" may be broad enough to preclude entry of de novo orders.
Furthermore, avoiding entry of a de novo order if another order already exists is compatible with the intent of the new Federal law, as indicated by the "Statement of Policy"and "Purposes" that underlie the law. The "Statement of Policy" declares that "it is necessary to establish national standards under which the courts of the various States shall determine their jurisdiction to issue a child support order..." Among the explicit "Purposes" of the legislation are "discourag[ing] continuing interstate controversies" and "avoid[ing] jurisdictional competition." These statements indicate Congressional intent that States give deference to an existing child support order. If a de novo order were issued in a case with an existing order, "interstate controversy" and "jurisdictional competition" would remain--contrary to the expressed intent of Congress. The existence of multiple orders in a case creates confusion about which order should be followed and makes calculation of arrearages and reconciliation of amounts paid on the various orders extremely difficult.
At least one court has addressed this issue. The New York Family Court, Kings County, recently dismissed a proceeding to establish a de novo order under New York's Uniform Support of Dependents Law (New York's equivalent of URESA) because another State had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act. (See In re Isabel M. (Thomas M.); NY FamCt KingsCty, NYLJ 3/21/95.
Enforcement
12. Question: Can the support provisions of an original order be prospectively enforced once that order has been modified by another State?
Answer: No. The original order can no longer be prospectively enforced for any amount that accrues once the order has been modified in a manner consistent with Federal law. Section 1738B(f) of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act provides that a tribunal that no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order may continue to enforce the order with respect to nonmodifiable obligations and arrearages that accrued before the date on which a modification of the order is made.
13. Question: If an issuing State is enforcing its order, how will it know if the order is modified by another State?
Answer: The new Federal law does not address this issue. For UIFSA States, section 611(e) of UIFSA requires that the party obtaining the modification file a certified copy of the new order with the issuing tribunal which had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier order, and in each tribunal in which the party knows that earlier order has been registered. Such notification is important because the State that issued the earlier order, or any State that registered the earlier order, will need to update its financial records to reflect the new order and to stop prospective enforcement of the earlier order. OCSE recommends that such notification be provided when a modification is made by a tribunal in any State, regardless of whether that State has adopted UIFSA.
14. Question: Can a tribunal without continuing, exclusive jurisdiction prospectively enforce an order?
Answer: Yes. Assuming the tribunal has any necessary jurisdiction, a tribunal without continuing, exclusive jurisdiction should enforce an order according to its terms just as if the order was entered within the State. The purpose of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act is to facilitate the enforcement of child support orders regardless of which State retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
15. Question: How long should a State enforce a support order that was issued in another State? In other words, does the issuing State's law or the enforcing State's law govern duration of support (for example in a case where the enforcing State has a younger age of majority than the issuing State)?
Answer: The issuing State's law appears to govern duration of support. Section 1738B(g)(1) of the new Federal law says that, in interpreting a child support order, a tribunal shall apply the law of the State of the tribunal that issued the order. In addition, section 1738B(a)(1) requires a State to enforce another State's order according to its terms. Note that the definition of "child" in section 1738B(b) includes persons over age 18, thereby allowing for the duration of support to extend beyond a child's 18th birthday, if the issuing State's law so provides. Furthermore, section 604 of UIFSA explicitly says that the law of the issuing State governs the duration of current payments. Finally, note that 1738B(g)(3) of the new Federal law provides that, in an action to enforce a child support order, a court shall apply the statute of limitation of the forum State or the State of the court that issued the order, whichever statute provides the longer period of limitation.
16. Question: Section 1738B(f) of the new law provides that a tribunal of a State that no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a child support order may enforce the order with respect to nonmodifiable obligations and arrearages that accrued before the date on which a modification of the order is made. Can a tribunal in a State other than the State that issued the original order enforce arrearages that accrued under the original order prior to modification?
Answer: Yes, any tribunal with authority under State law can enforce the arrearages. We believe 1738B(f) was not meant to limit any State's ability to enforce arrearages, but rather to clarify that an issuing tribunal, even after losing continuing exclusive jurisdiction, still has the power to enforce arrearages which accrued prior to the modification.
17. Question: Does the new Federal law address which State's laws govern procedural matters (fees, timeframe's, withholding limits) in a direct withholding case (where a IV-D agency sends a withholding notice/order directly to an out-of-State employer)?
Answer: Section 1738B(g) of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act says "in a proceeding to establish, modify, or enforce a child support order, the forum State's law shall apply" [with two specifically delineated exceptions]. Since direct withholding is a "proceeding to enforce a child support order", the forum State's law governs procedural matters in direct withholding cases.
The new Federal law does not address which State is the forum State in a direct withholding case. We believe it can be argued that the forum State is the employee's work State (i.e., the State where the employee's/obligor's work site is located). This interpretation is consistent with 1738B(g)(3) which implies that the forum State is not the same as the State that issued the order in an action to enforce. Moreover, the laws of the employee's work State would govern in a case where: (1) withholding is challenged and a contest is held in the employee's work State; or, (2) the withholding is sent to the IV-D agency in the employee's work State (rather than directly to the employer) for interstate income withholding. It seems logical and consistent for the same laws to govern in a direct withholding case, rather than having the choice of laws switch once a contest or interstate income withholding occurs. Furthermore, the employer will be familiar with local law and should, logically, treat all withholding orders the same.
Registration
18. Question: Does the new Federal law do away with the need to register another State's child support order? Does the law limit a tribunal's authority to register another State's support order?
Answer: The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act does not address registration. If State law (URESA, RURESA, UIFSA, USDL) provides for a registration process, that process can still be used as long as appropriate orders are registered, and registered orders are afforded full faith and credit. The initiating State still must meet the responding State's legal requirements for registration (e.g., by providing the required number of copies--properly certified if required by the responding State--of any order to be registered).
Even though Federal law now requires a State to give full faith and credit to child support orders issued in other States, there may still be benefits to a registration process. Registration fulfills an administrative function by providing a mechanism for the registering State to include the registered child support order in its own records. Registration may be necessary for certain enforcement procedures to be utilized, such as imposition of a lien. Furthermore, notice to the non-registering party and the opportunity to contest help to ensure due process.
The new Federal law does not limit a tribunal's authority to register another State's child support order. However, the new law may alter the effect of registration, particularly the registering tribunal's ability to modify the registered order. The registering tribunal can only modify a registered order if appropriate in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1738B(e).
Multiple Existing Orders
19. Question: If multiple orders currently exist governing the same obligor/obligee/child, which order can be modified?
Answer: The new Federal law does not address the issue of which order can be modified if multiple orders exist. Under Federal law, potentially any of the existing orders can be modified, as long as the modification is made in accordance with Federal requirements at 45 CFR 303.8 and is either made by the original issuing State or made in accordance with 1738B(e).
However, State law may contain additional constraints. If a State has adopted UIFSA, section 207 of UIFSA provides a priority scheme for determining which order is controlling when multiple orders regarding the same obligor/obligee/ child exist. For most case circumstances, this scheme identifies one controlling order that can be modified. Under this scheme, if multiple orders exist, an order issued by a tribunal of the child's current home State (defined as the State in which a child has lived for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a petition for support) is given highest priority. If more than one of these orders exists, priority is given to the most recently issued.
20. Question: If multiple orders currently exist governing the same obligor/obligee/child, which order should a State enforce for current support?
Answer: The new Federal law does not directly address the issue of which order should be enforced if multiple orders exist. However, both (R)URESA and UIFSA contain provisions under which payments made on one order are credited towards the amounts due on other orders. For example, in a case with two orders (one for $150 per month and one for $200 per month) for the same obligor/obligee/child, a State cannot cumulatively enforce both orders (i.e., cannot collect a total of $350 per month). Amounts collected under the $150 order would be credited towards the $200 order (and vice versa).
If a State has adopted UIFSA, section 207 of UIFSA provides a priority scheme for recognition and enforcement of existing multiple orders regarding the same obligor/obligee/ child. For most case circumstances, this scheme identifies one controlling order that should be enforced. Under this scheme, if multiple orders exist, an order issued by a tribunal of the child's current home State (defined as the State in which a child has lived for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a petition for support) is given highest priority. If more than one of these orders exists, priority is given to the order most recently issued. Even if a State has not adopted UIFSA, it might consider adopting the priority scheme in section 207 of UIFSA to promote national consistency in cases in which there are multiple orders.
21. Question: Under the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, the existence of prior orders may have an impact upon an interstate proceeding. How does a State determine the existence of other orders?
Answer: When sending an interstate referral to another State, the initiating State should notify the responding State about the existence of all known orders in a case, and send copies as appropriate. Under 45 CFR 303.7(b)(4), the initiating IV-D agency must provide the responding IV-D agency with sufficient, accurate information necessary to act on the case. Information about prior orders can be included in the Child Support Enforcement Transmittal as well as the General Testimony. Communication between the initiating and responding jurisdictions is essential in interstate cases.
A State may also ascertain the existence of orders by methods such as:
Other Issues
22. Question: What should a responding State do when it receives a request for action on an incoming interstate referral that the responding State cannot take under the new Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act?
Answer: If the initiating State requested an action that the responding State cannot take under the new Federal law (such as modification of an order when the State lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify), the responding State should indicate on the Child Support Enforcement Acknowledgment that it cannot take the action and the reason why.