

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

Draft – Not for Implementation

Consideration of Enforcement Policies for Tests During a Section 564 Declared Emergency

Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff

DRAFT GUIDANCE

This draft guidance document is being distributed for comment purposes only.

Document issued on May 6, 2024.

You should submit comments and suggestions regarding this draft document within 60 days of publication in the *Federal Register* of the notice announcing the availability of the draft guidance. Submit electronic comments to <https://www.regulations.gov>. Submit written comments to the Dockets Management Staff, Food and Drug Administration, 5630 Fishers Lane, Room 1061, (HFA-305), Rockville, MD 20852-1740. Identify all comments with the docket number listed in the notice of availability that publishes in the *Federal Register*.

For questions about this document, contact the CDRH Guidance Program in the Office of Policy at CDRH-Guidance@fda.hhs.gov.



U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Food and Drug Administration
Center for Devices and Radiological Health

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

Draft – Not for Implementation

Preface

Additional Copies

Additional copies are available from the Internet. You may also send an email request to CDRH-Guidance@fda.hhs.gov to receive a copy of the guidance. Please include the document number GUI00007009 and complete title of the guidance in the request.

DRAFT

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

Draft – Not for Implementation

Table of Contents

I. Introduction.....	1
II. Background.....	2
III. Factors to Consider in Deciding Whether to Issue an Enforcement Policy for Unapproved Tests	3

DRAFT

Consideration of Enforcement Policies for Tests During a Section 564 Declared Emergency

Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff

This draft guidance, when finalized, will represent the current thinking of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) on this topic. It does not establish any rights for any person and is not binding on FDA or the public. You can use an alternative approach if it satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations. To discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA staff or Office responsible for this guidance as listed on the title page.

I. Introduction¹

FDA plays a critical role in protecting the United States (U.S.) from emergencies and public health threats such as emerging infectious diseases and chemical agents. In certain circumstances, emergencies and threats could lead to an HHS Secretary declaration under section 564 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) enabling FDA to issue emergency use authorizations (EUAs). After such a declaration, FDA also may decide to issue an enforcement policy to help expand availability of certain devices. FDA is issuing this draft guidance that, when finalized, will describe the factors FDA plans to assess in deciding whether to issue an enforcement policy regarding test manufacturers'² offering of certain devices,³

¹ This draft guidance has been prepared by the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) in consultation with the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).

² For purposes of this document, we use “manufacturers” for those entities conducting any activity that constitutes manufacturing as described in FDA regulations (e.g., design, preparation, propagation, assembly, and processing). See 21 CFR 807.3(d) and 820.3(o).

³ Under section 201(h)(1) of the FD&C Act, the term “device” is defined as follows:

“an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is--

(A) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,

(B) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or

(C) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

Draft – Not for Implementation

24 specifically unapproved tests⁴ and unapproved uses of approved tests,⁵ for the diagnosis of
25 disease or other conditions during a declared emergency.⁶

26
27 In general, FDA’s guidance documents do not establish legally enforceable responsibilities.
28 Instead, guidances describe the Agency’s current thinking on a topic and should be viewed only
29 as recommendations, unless specific regulatory or statutory requirements are cited. The use of
30 the word *should* in Agency guidances means that something is suggested or recommended, but
31 not required.

32

33 **II. Background**

34 Appropriately safe and effective diagnostic tests are critical to the diagnosis, treatment, tracking,
35 and interruption of transmission of infectious diseases during outbreaks, as well as for
36 diagnosing and treating diseases or conditions caused by chemical, biological, radiological, and
37 nuclear (CBRN) threat agents. Tests are also critical for evaluating the impact or effectiveness of
38 certain public health interventions. In the event of these types of emergencies and threats, often
39 there is no available FDA-approved test to diagnose the disease or condition.

40

41 Under section 564 of the FD&C Act, FDA may authorize emergency use of unapproved medical
42 products, or unapproved uses of approved medical products, when certain criteria are met, after
43 the HHS Secretary has made a declaration of emergency or threat justifying authorization of
44 emergency use, to diagnose, treat, or prevent diseases or conditions caused by CBRN threat
45 agents, as well as other agents that may present a heightened risk to the U.S. military forces. For
46 information on FDA’s implementation of this and other emergency use authorities, see FDA’s
47 guidance “[Emergency Use Authorization of Medical Products and Related Authorities](#).”⁷ FDA
48 has issued EUAs for tests for H1N1 (2009), H7N9 (2013), MERS-CoV (2013), Ebola (2014),

which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes. The term ‘device’ does not include software functions excluded pursuant to section 520(o)” of the FD&C Act.

⁴ Consistent with section 564 of the FD&C Act and other FDA authorities, “unapproved tests” refers to a test that is not approved, licensed, granted or cleared under section 510(k), 513(f)(2) or 515 of the FD&C Act or section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act), as applicable. The terms “approved test” and “FDA-approved test” refer to a test that is approved, licensed, granted or cleared under section 510(k), 513(f)(2) or 515 of the FD&C Act or section 351 of the PHS Act, as applicable. See “unapproved product” in section 564(a)(2)(A) of the FD&C Act.

⁵ Consistent with section 564 of the FD&C Act and other FDA authorities, “unapproved use of an approved test” refers to a test that is approved, licensed, granted or cleared under section 510(k), 513(f)(2) or 515 of the FD&C Act or section 351 of the PHS Act, but for which the specific use is not an approved, licensed, granted or cleared use of the product. See “unapproved use of an approved product” in section 564(a)(2)(B) of the FD&C Act. Examples of unapproved uses of approved tests would be the over-the-counter use of a test approved for prescription use only or the use of nasal swab samples with a test approved for use with nasopharyngeal swab samples.

⁶ For purposes of this guidance, “unapproved tests” refers to unapproved tests and unapproved uses of approved tests.

⁷ Available at <https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/emergency-use-authorization-medical-products-and-related-authorities>

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

Draft – Not for Implementation

49 Enterovirus D68 (2015), Zika (2016), Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (2020), and mpox
50 (formerly monkeypox) (2022).⁸

51

52 In certain situations, even when there is a relevant declaration under section 564 of the FD&C
53 Act and FDA has issued EUAs for certain tests, FDA may find it appropriate to also issue an
54 enforcement policy regarding the distribution and use of certain unapproved tests for which
55 EUAs have not been issued to help further expand access to such tests as quickly as possible.
56 During the recent COVID-19⁹ and mpox¹⁰ responses, FDA issued guidance with enforcement
57 policies for certain tests to help facilitate availability and quickly increase national testing
58 capacity. Those enforcement policies helped to supplement the availability of tests when, even
59 with access to EUA-authorized or FDA-cleared tests, there were still insufficient tests to meet
60 demand during the emergencies.

61

62 In May 2022, following a request by Congress to review FDA’s oversight of tests for COVID-
63 19, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report to Congress titled
64 “FDA Took Steps to Help Make Tests Available; Policy for Future Public Health Emergencies
65 Needed.”¹¹ In this report, GAO recommended “that FDA develop a policy for the use of
66 enforcement discretion regarding unauthorized tests in future public health emergencies. This
67 policy should include the conditions under which FDA would begin and end the use of such
68 discretion.”¹²

69

70 This draft guidance describes the factors FDA intends to consider in determining whether to
71 issue an enforcement policy regarding use of unapproved tests during a declared emergency.¹³

72

73 III. Factors to Consider in Deciding Whether to Issue an 74 Enforcement Policy for Unapproved Tests

⁸ The year in each parentheses represents when the first emergency declaration under section 564 of the FD&C Act was issued for each outbreak justifying the emergency use authorization of unapproved tests. For some of the declared emergencies there have been subsequent declarations issued under section 564 of the FD&C Act for emergency use authorization of unapproved tests as the emergency evolved.

⁹ See “Policy for Coronavirus Disease-2019 Tests (Revised),” available at <https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/policy-coronavirus-disease-2019-tests-during-public-health-emergency-revised>

¹⁰ See “Policy for Monkeypox Tests to Address the Public Health Emergency,” available at <https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/policy-monkeypox-tests-address-public-health-emergency>

¹¹ Available at <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104266>

¹² See footnote 11.

¹³ We note that this draft guidance relates to the time period after the exposure or outbreak results in an applicable section 564 declaration. FDA has issued another draft guidance that describes an enforcement policy for certain laboratory manufacturers offering certain unauthorized in vitro diagnostic devices (IVDs) for immediate response to CBRN agents in the absence of a declaration applicable to IVDs under section 564 of the FD&C Act. See FDA draft guidance document “Enforcement Policy for Certain In Vitro Diagnostic Devices for Immediate Public Health Response in the Absence of a Declaration under Section 564” available at <https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/enforcement-policy-certain-in-vitro-diagnostic-devices-immediate-public-health-response-absence>

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

Draft – Not for Implementation

75 FDA may decide it is appropriate to issue an enforcement policy (or policies) indicating its intent
76 not to object to the limited offering of certain unapproved tests for the diagnosis of a specific
77 disease or other condition under certain circumstances, such as to help quickly increase test
78 availability, during a declared emergency under section 564 of the FD&C Act. FDA intends to
79 outline any such policy in guidance that identifies, among other things, the intended scope of the
80 enforcement policy regarding certain legal requirements (e.g., premarket review, quality system),
81 the rationale for the policy, FDA’s general performance expectations for tests offered as
82 described in the policy, and the intended duration of the policy. FDA may also identify any
83 applicable legal requirements that are outside the scope of the enforcement policy (e.g.,
84 complying with applicable medical device reporting (MDR) requirements under 21 CFR Part
85 803) and clarify that the enforcement policies would not apply to tests falling outside the scope
86 of the guidance.

87
88 In determining whether to issue an enforcement policy for certain unapproved tests, FDA intends
89 to assess, among other things: (1) the need for accelerated availability of such tests, (2) the
90 known or potential risks of such tests, (3) the availability of appropriate alternative tests that are
91 authorized or approved, and (4) the availability of sufficient mitigations to address risks of false
92 results, as discussed more fully below:

- 93
- 94 • **Need:** FDA intends to look at the testing needs of the emergency response. This may
95 include consideration of the number of, and access to, FDA-approved/authorized tests
96 available and how time sensitive the need for a test is (i.e., if there is sufficient time to
97 wait for a test to be cleared, approved, or authorized for emergency use). In considering
98 the time sensitivity of the need, factors such as the transmission levels, potential for
99 asymptomatic infections, the size of the population potentially exposed, and morbidity
100 and mortality rates may be considered. FDA also may consider the volume of tests
101 needed to address the testing needs, considering the patient population(s) in need of
102 testing, including estimates based on appropriate modeling for transmission or exposure,
103 and whether the ability to scale up production to account for the needed test capacity
104 should be accounted for in an enforcement policy. In determining need, FDA also intends
105 to examine the type of test best suited to assist in the response. This may include highly
106 accurate or high-throughput molecular diagnostic tests that can rule out infection, antigen
107 diagnostic tests that may be less accurate but more accessible and less costly, or in rare
108 cases, serology tests that can detect recent infection. Different types of tests may be
109 helpful to the response depending on the type of emergency. For example, while
110 molecular diagnostic tests may be appropriate for detection of a virus, different types of
111 specialized tests may be needed for a radiological exposure. Further, while serological
112 tests may not always be useful during an initial outbreak, during the Zika outbreak,
113 serology tests were important for understanding whether a pregnant person had a recent
114 infection. Evaluation of need may also include consideration of the turnaround time for
115 results with authorized tests. For example, in the early stages of the COVID-19
116 pandemic, FDA issued an enforcement policy to help increase testing options when FDA
117 became aware that a backlog of specimens was contributing to test results taking many
118 days to be processed. Later in the COVID-19 pandemic, FDA narrowed the enforcement
119 policy to focus only on specific types of tests for which increased access was still needed.

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

Draft – Not for Implementation

- 120
- 121
- 122
- 123
- 124
- 125
- 126
- 127
- 128
- 129
- 130 • **Risk:** FDA intends to consider the risks to public health when unauthorized, and
131 potentially inaccurate, tests are used. This includes consideration of the seriousness of the
132 life-threatening disease or condition, the complexity of the technology of the test, and the
133 experience of test manufacturers, among other things. For example, certain tests for
134 radiological exposure are very complex and require a high level of training. FDA
135 considered these factors for COVID-19 and mpox, and the different public health risks
136 led to different enforcement policies. FDA also intends to consider other risks as
137 appropriate, such as risks associated with sample collection or certain test components.
 - 138 • **Alternatives:** FDA intends to look at whether there are appropriate alternatives to
139 diagnose the disease or condition. In considering the adequacy of alternatives, FDA
140 intends to look at the manufacturing capacity of any alternatives and ability for the
141 alternative(s) to meet the testing need. For example, when considering whether to issue
142 an enforcement policy for COVID-19 tests at the beginning of the emergency, FDA
143 considered that there was only one test authorized for emergency use, and supply was
144 limited. When considering whether to issue an enforcement policy for mpox tests, FDA
145 considered that there was an FDA-cleared diagnostic test for the detection of non-variola
146 Orthopoxvirus DNA that was able to detect mpox,¹⁴ but the cleared test was limited to
147 use by certain laboratories and the turnaround times for results were up to a few days.
 - 148 • **Mitigations:** FDA intends to consider the availability of other factors that may mitigate
149 the risk of false results from unapproved tests. False results not only negatively impact
150 the individual patient relying on a test but can also have an impact on broad public health
151 decisions during an emergency. FDA intends to consider such factors as manufacturer
152 experience (e.g., manufacturers who have successfully been issued an EUA for a test
153 during a public health emergency, received approval or clearance for a diagnostic test, or
154 have similar experience and are manufacturers for whom FDA does not have current
155 compliance concerns), participation in a government evaluation program such as the
156 National Institutes of Health (NIH) Rapid Acceleration of Diagnostics (RADx) Tech
157 program’s Independent Test Assessment Program (ITAP),¹⁵ certain validation
158 recommendations, certain labeling statements, availability of confirmatory testing, public
159 disclosure by manufacturers that the tests have not been reviewed by FDA, and
160 submission of an EUA request within a reasonable period of time, among others. FDA
161 intends to provide any relevant recommendations for test validation specific to a
162 particular emergency or potential emergency in the guidance document for a specific
163 enforcement policy, as appropriate.

158 When issuing an enforcement policy, FDA generally intends to describe the circumstances in
159 which the agency intends to exercise enforcement discretion, including, for example, when the

¹⁴ The CDC non-variola Orthopoxvirus test was first cleared in 2018. In 2022, the FDA cleared additional 510(k)s from CDC, which expanded testing capacity through use of additional components and in additional laboratories. At the time of issuance of the enforcement policy for mpox, the latest cleared 510(k) was K222558, available at: <https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K222558>

¹⁵ For more information on ITAP, see <https://www.nibib.nih.gov/covid-19/radx-tech-program/ITAP>

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

Draft – Not for Implementation

160 test has been validated. Any such policy may include recommendations for validation procedures
161 and labeling, among other considerations. FDA’s COVID-19 and mpox test guidances both
162 described validation procedures and labeling for tests offered as described in those guidances.

163 In any such enforcement policy, FDA may identify an initial period in which the enforcement
164 policy is intended to be in effect. FDA may adjust, including shortening or lengthening this
165 period, as appropriate.

166
167 Consistent with 21 CFR 10.115(k), FDA will periodically review any issued enforcement policy
168 guidance to determine whether it needs to be changed or withdrawn. For example, during the
169 COVID-19 declared emergency, FDA issued six updates to the “[Policy for Coronavirus Disease-
170 2019 Tests \(Revised\)](#)” guidance to reflect the changes in the country’s needs and test landscape.

171
172 Regardless of an enforcement policy, FDA retains discretion to pursue enforcement action
173 against the offering of unapproved tests with respect to violations of the FD&C Act, Public
174 Health Service (PHS Act), or FDA regulations, and FDA intends to pursue such actions in
175 individual cases when appropriate for public health.

DRAFT